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Abstract. In this paper we introduce a robust matching technique that
allows to operate a very accurate selection of corresponding feature points
from multiple views. Robustness is achieved by enforcing global geomet-
ric consistency at an early stage of the matching process, without the
need of ex-post verification through reprojection. Two forms of global
consistency are proposed, but in both cases they are reduced to pairwise
compatibilities making use of the size and orientation information pro-
vided by common feature descriptors. Then a game-theoretic approach
is used to select a maximally consistent set of candidate matches, where
highly compatible matches are enforced while incompatible correspon-
dences are driven to extinction. The effectiveness of the approach in
estimating camera parameters for bundle adjustment is assessed and
compared with state-of-the-art techniques.
1 Introduction
The selection of 3D point correspondences from their 2D projections is arguably
one of the most important steps in image based multi-view reconstruction, as er-
rors in the initial correspondences can lead to sub-optimal parameter estimation.
The selection of corresponding points is usually carried out by means of interest
point detectors and feature descriptors. Salient points are localized with sub-
pixel accuracy by general detectors, such as Harris Operator [2] and Difference
of Gaussians [6], or by using techniques that are able to locate affine invariant
regions, such as Maximally stable extremal regions (MSER) [7] and Hessian-
Affine [8]. This latter affine invariance property is desirable since the change in
appearance of a scene region after a small camera motion can be locally approx-
imated with an affine transformation. Once salient and well-identifiable points
are found on each image, correspondences between the features in the various
views must be extracted and fed to the bundle adjustment algorithm. To this
end, each point is associated a descriptor vector with tens to hundreds of di-
mensions, which usually include a scale and a rotation value. Arguably the most
famous of such descriptors are the Scale-invariant feature transform (SIFT) [4],
the Speeded Up Robust Features (SURF) [3], and the Gradient Location and
Orientation Histogram (GLOH) [9], and more recently the Local Energy based
Shape Histogram (LESH) [10]. Features are designed so that similar image re-
gions subject to similarity transformation exhibit descriptor vectors with small
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Fig. 1. Locally uniform 3D motion does not result in a locally uniform 2D motion.
From left to right: 3D scene, left and right views, and motion estimation.
Euclidean distance. This property is used to match each point with a candidate
with similar descriptor. However, if the descriptor is not distinctive enough this
approach is prone to select many outliers since it only exploits local information.
This limitation conflicts with the richness of information that is embedded in
the scene structure. For instance, under the assumption of rigidity and small
camera motion, features that are close in one view are expected to be close in
the other one as well. In addition, if a pair of features exhibit a certain dif-
ference of angles or ratio of scales, this relation should be maintained among
their respective matches. This prior information about scene structure can be
accounted for by using a feature tracker [5,12] to extract correspondences, but
this requires that the view positions be not far apart. Further, in the presence of
strong parallax, a locally uniform 3D motion does not result in a locally uniform
2D motion, and for these reasons the geometric constraints can be enforced only
locally (see Fig. 1 for an example). A common heuristic for the enforcement
of global structure is to eliminate points that exhibit a large reprojection error
after a first round of Bundle Adjustment [13]. Unfortunately this post-filtering
technique requires good initial estimates to begin with.
In this paper we introduce a robust matching technique that allows to oper-
ate a very accurate inlier selection at an early stage of the process and without
any need to rely on 3D reprojections. The approach selects feasible matches by
enforcing global geometric consistency. Two geometric consistency models are
presented. The first enforces that all pairs of correspondences between 2D views
are consistent with a common 3D rigid transformation. Here, as is common in
similar point-matching approaches, we assume that we have reasonable guesses
for the intrinsic camera parameters and reduce the problem space to the search
of a 3D rigid transformation from one image space to the other. This condition
is in general underspecified, as a whole manifold of pairs of correspondences
are consistent with a rigid 3D transformation. However, by accumulating mu-
tual support through a large set of mutually compatible correspondences one
can expect to reduce the ambiguity to a single 3D rigid transformation. In the
proposed approach, high order consistency constraints are reduced to a sec-
ond order compatibility where sets of 2D point correspondences that can be
interpreted as projections of rigidly-transformed 3D points all have high mutual
support. The reduction is obtained by making use of the scale and orienta-
tion information linked with each feature point in the SIFT descriptor [4] and a
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further reprojection that can be considered a continuous form of hypergraph
clique expansion [15].
The second geometric consistency constraint assumes a weak perspective cam-
era and matches together points whose maps are compatible with a common
affine transformation. This allows us to extract small coherent clusters of points
all laying at similar depths. The locally affine hypothesis could seem to be an
unsound assumption for general camera motion, and in effect cannot account for
point inversion due to parallax, but in the experimental section we will show that
it holds well with the typical disparity found in standard data sets. Further, it
should be noted that with large camera motion most, if not all, commonly used
feature detectors fail, thus any inlier selection attempt becomes meaningless.
Once the geometric consistency contraints are specified, we can use them to
drive the matching process. Following [14,1], we model the matching process in a
game-theoretic framework, where two players extracted from a large population
select a pair of matching points from two images. The player then receives a
payoff from the other players proportional to how compatible his match is with
respect to the other player’s choice, where the compatibility derives from some
utility function that rewards pair of matches that are consistent. Clearly, it is in
each player’s interest to pick matches that are compatible with those the other
players are likely to choose. In general, as the game is repeated, players will adapt
their behavior to prefer matchings that yield larger payoffs, driving all incon-
sistent hypotheses to extinction, and settling for an equilibrium where the pool
of matches from which the players are still actively selecting their associations
forms a cohesive set with high mutual support. Within this formulation, the solu-
tions of the matching problem correspond to evolutionary stable states (ESS’s),
a robust population-based generalization of the notion of a Nash equilibrium. In
a sense, this matching process can be seen as a contextual voting system, where
each time the game is repeated the previous selections of the other players affect
the future vote of each player in an attempt to reach consensus. This way, the
evolving context brings global information into the selection process.
2 Pairwise Geometric Consistency
In what follows we will describe the two geometric constraints that will be used
to drive the matching process. The first approach tries to impose that the points
be consistent with a common 3D rigid transformation.
There are two fundamental hypotheses underlying the reduction to second or-
der of this high-order 3D geometric consistency. First, we assume that the views
have the same set of camera parameters, that we have reasonable guesses for
the intrinsic parameters, and we can ignore lens distortion. Thus, the geometric
consistency is reduced to the compatibility of the projected points with a single
3D rigid transformation related to the relative positions of the cameras. Second,
we assume that the feature descriptor provides scale and orientation information
and that this is related to actual local information in the 3D objects present in
the scene. The effect of the first assumption is that the geometric consistency is
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reduced to a rigidity constraint that can be cast as a conservation along views of
the distances between the unknown 3D position of the feature points, while the
effect of the second assumption is that we can recover the missing depth infor-
mation as a variation in scale between two views of the same point and that this
variation is inversely proportional to variation in projected size of the local patch
around the 3D point and, thus, to the projected size of the feature descriptor.
More formally, assume that we have two points p1 and p2, which in one view
have coordinates (u11, v11) and (u12, v12) respectively, while in a second image they
have coordinates (u21, v
2
1) and (u
2
2, v
2
2). These points, in the coordinate system
of the first camera, have 3D coordinates z11(u
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1 , f) and z
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2 , f) respec-
tively, while in the reference frame of the second camera they have coordinates
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2 , f). Up to a change in units, these coordinates can be
re-written as
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where f is the focal lenght and a is the ratio between the actual scales of the
local 3D patches around points p1 and p2, whose projections on the two views
give the perceived scales s11 and s
2
1 for point p1 and s
1
2 and s
2
2 for point p2.
The assumption that both scale and orientation are linked with actual prop-
erties of the local patch around each 3D point is equivalent to having 2 points
for each feature correspondence: the actual location of the feature, plus a virtual
point located along the axis of orientation of the feature at a distance propor-
tional to the actual scale of the patch. These pairs of 3D points must move
rigidly going from the coordinate system of one camera to the other, so that
given any two sets of correspondences with 3D points p1 and p2 and their corre-
sponding virtual points q1 and q2, the distances between these four points must
be preserved in the reference frames of every view (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Scale and orientation offer depth information and a second virtual point. The
conservation of the distances in green enforces consistency with a 3D rigid transforma-
tion.
Under a frontal-planar assumption for each local patch, or, less stringently,
under small variation in viewpoints, we can assign 3D coordinates to the virtual
points in the reference frames of the two images:
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where θji is the perceived orientation of feature i in image j. At this point,
given two sets of correspondences between points in two images, namely the
correspondence m1 between a feature point in the first image with coordinates,
scale and orientation (u11, v11 , s11, θ11) with the feature point in the second image
(u21, v
2
1 , s
2
1, θ
2
1), and the correspondence m2 between the points (u
1
2, v
1
2 , s
1
2, θ
1
2)
and (u22, v
2
2 , s
2
2, θ
2
2) in the first and second image respectively, we can compute a
distance from the manifold of feature descriptors compatible with a single 3D
rigid transformation as
d(m1,m2, a) = (||p11 − p12||2 − ||p21 − p22||2)2 + (||p11 − q12 ||2 − ||p21 − q22 ||2)2+
(||q11 − p12||2 − ||q21 − p22||2)2 + (||q11 − q12 ||2 − ||q21 − q22 ||2)2 .
From this we define the compatibility between correspondences as C(m1,m2) =
maxa e−γd(m1,m2,a), where a is maximized over a reasonable range of ratio of
scales of local 3D patches. In our experiments a was optimized in the interval
[0.5; 2].
The second geometric consistency constraint assumes a weak perspective cam-
era and matches together points whose maps are compatible with a common
affine transformation. Specifically, we are able to associate to each matching
strategy (a1, a2) one and only one similarity transformation, that we call T (a1, a2).
When this transformation is applied to a1 it produces the point a2, but when
applied to the source point b1 of the matching strategy (b1, b2) it does not need
to produce b2. In fact it will produce b2 if and only if T (a1, a2) = T (b1, b2),
otherwise it will give a point b′2 that is as near to b2 as the transformation
T (a1, a2) is similar T (b1, b2). Given two matching strategies (a1, a2) and (b1, b2)
and their respective associated similarities T (a1, a2) and T (b1, b2), we calculate
their reciprocal reprojected points as:
a′2 = T (b1, b2)a1
b′2 = T (a1, a2)b1
That is the virtual points obtained by applying to each source point the similarity
transformation associated to the other match (see Fig 3). Given virtual points
a′2 and b
′
2 we are finally able to calculate the payoff between (a1, a2) and (b1, b2)
as:
Π((a1, a2), (b1, b2)) = e−λmax(||a2−a
′
2||,||b2−b′2||) (1)
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Fig. 3. The payoff between two matching strategies is inversely proportional to the
maximum reprojection error obtained by applying the affine transformation estimated
by a match to the other
Where λ is a selectivity parameter that allows to operate a more or less strict
inlier selection. If λ is small, then the payoff function (and thus the matching)
is more tolerant, otherwise the evolutionary process becomes more selective as
λ grows.
The rationale of the payoff function proposed in equation 1 is that, while
by changing point of view the similarity relationship between features is not
mantained (as the object is not planar and the transformation is projective), we
can expect the transformation to be a similarity at least “locally”. This means
that we aim to extract clusters of feature matches that belong to the same region
of the object and that tend to lie in the same level of depth.
Each matching process selects a group of matching strategies that are coherent
with respect to a local similarity transformation. This means that if we want to
cover a large portion of the subject we need to iterate many times and prune
the previously selected matches at each new start. Obviously, after all the depth
levels have been swept, small and not significative residual groups start to emerge
from the evolution. To avoid the selection of this spurious matches we fixed a
minimum cardinality for each valid group.
3 Game-Theoretic Feature Matching
We model the matching process in a game-theoretic framework [1], where two
players extracted from a large population select a pair of matching points from
two images. The player then receives a payoff from the other players proportional
to how compatible his match is with respect to the other player’s choice. Clearly,
it is in each player’s interest to pick matches that are compatible with those the
other players are likely to choose. It is supposed that some selection process
operates over time on the distribution of behaviors favoring players that receive
larger payoffs and driving all inconsistent hypotheses to extinction, finally set-
tling for an equilibrium where the pool of matches from which the players are
still actively selecting their associations forms a cohesive set with high mutual
support. More formally, let O = {1, · · · , n} be the set of available strategies (pure
strategies in the language of game theory) and C = (cij) be a matrix specifying
the payoff that an individual playing strategy i receives against someone play-
ing strategy j. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution x = (x1, . . . , xn)T
over the available strategies O, thus lying in the n-dimensional standard sim-
plex Δn = {x ∈ IRn : ∀i ∈ 1 . . . n xi ≥ 0,
∑n
i=1xi = 1} . The expected payoff
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Fig. 4. An example of the evolutionary process. Four feature points are extracted
from two images and a total of six matching strategies are selected as initial hypothe-
ses. The matrix Π shows the compatibilities between pairs of matching strategies ac-
cording to a one-to-one similarity-enforcing payoff function. Each matching strategy
got zero payoff with itself and with strategies that share the same source or destina-
tion point (i.e., Π((b1, b2), (c1, b2)) = 0). Strategies that are coherent with respect to
a similarity transformation exhibit high payoff values (i.e., Π((a1, a2), (b1, b2)) = 1
and π((a1, a2), (d1, d2)) = 0.9)), while less compatible pairs get lower scores (i.e.,
π((a1, a2), (c1, c2)) = 0.1). Initially (at T=0) the population is set to the barycen-
ter of the simplex and slightly perturbed. After just one iteration, (c1, b2) and (c1, c2)
have lost a significant amount of support, while (d1, c2) and (d1, d2) are still played by
a sizable amount of population. After ten iterations (T=10) (d1, d2) has finally pre-
vailed over (d1, c2) (note that the two are mutually exclusive). Note that in the final
population ((a1, a2), (b1, b2)) have a larger support than (d1, d2) since they are a little
more coherent with respect to similarity.
received by a player choosing element i when playing against a player adopting
a mixed strategy x is (Cx)i =
∑
j cijxj , hence the expected payoff received by
adopting the mixed strategy y against x is yT Cx. A strategy x is said to be a
Nash equilibrium if it is the best reply to itself, i.e., ∀y ∈ Δ, xT Cx ≥ yT Cx .
A strategy x is said to be an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) if it is a Nash
equilibrium and ∀y ∈ Δ xT Cx = yT Cx ⇒ xT Cy > yT Cy. This condition
guarantees that any deviation from the stable strategies does not pay. The search
for a stable state is performed by simulating the evolution of a natural selection
process. Under very loose conditions, any dynamics that respect the payoffs is
guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibria and (hopefully) to ESS’s; for this rea-
son, the choice of an actual selection process is not crucial and can be driven
mostly by considerations of efficiency and simplicity. We chose to use the repli-
cator dynamics, a well-known formalization of the selection process governed by
the recurrence x(t+1)i = x
t
i
(Cxt)i
xtT Cxt
, where xti is the proportion of the population
that plays the i-th strategy at time t. Once the population has reached a lo-
cal maximum, all the non-extincted pure strategies can be considered selected
by the game. One final note should be made about one-to-one matching. Since
each source feature can correspond with at most one destination point, it is
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desirable to avoid any kind of multiple match. It is easy to show that a pair
of strategies with mutual zero payoff cannot belong to the support of an ESS
(see [1]), thus any payoff function can easily be adapted to enforce one-to-one
matching by setting to 0 the payoff of mates that share either the source or the
destination point.
4 Experimental Results
To evaluate the performance of our proposals, we compared the results with
those obtained with the keymatcher included in the structure-from-motion suite
Bundler [13]. For the first set of experiments we selected pairs of adjacent views
from the ”DinoRing” and ”TempleRing” sequences from the Middlebury Multi-
View Stereo dataset [11]; for these models, camera parameters are provided
and used as a ground-truth. For all the sets of experiments we evaluated the
differences in radians between the (calibrated) ground-truth and respectively
the estimated rotation angle (Δα) and rotation axis (Δγ). The “Dino” model is
a difficult case in general, as it provides very few features; the upper part of Fig. 5
shows the correspondences produced by our game -theoretic matching approach
GT-3Drigid GT-2Daffine Bundler GT-3Drigid GT-2Daffine Bundler
Dino sequence
GT-3Drigid GT-2Daffine Bundler
Matches 262.5 ± 61.4 271.1 ± 64.2 172.4 ± 79.5
Δα 0.0668 ± 0.0777 0.0497 ± 0.0810 0.0767 ± 0.1172
Δγ 0.4393 ± 0.4963 0.3184 ± 0.3247 0.6912 ± 0.8793
Temple sequence
GT-3Drigid GT-2Daffine Bundler
Mathces 535.7 ± 38.7 564.3 ± 37.2 349.3 ± 36.2
Δα 0.1326 ± 0.0399 0.0989 ± 0.0224 0.1414 ± 0.0215
Δγ 0.0809 ± 0.0144 0.0792 ± 0.0091 0.0850 ± 0.0065
Fig. 5. Results obtained with the Dino and Temple data sets
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Fig. 6. Analysis of the performance of the approach with respect to variation of the
parameters of the algorithm
with geometric constraints enforcing a 3D rigid transformation (GT-3Drigid),
the approach with the weak perspective camera assumptions (GT-2Daffine),
and the Bundler matcher (Bundler). The color of the points matched using GT-
2Daffine relate to the extraction group, i.e., points with the same color have
been matched at th same re-iteration of the game-theoretic matching process.
The “Temple” model is richer in features and for visualization purposes we only
show a subset of the detected matches for all three techniques. The Bundler
matcher, while still achieving good results, provides some mismatches in both
cases. This can be explained by the fact that the symmetric parts of the object,
e.g. the pillars in the temple model, result in very similar features that are hard
to disambiguate by a purely local matcher. Both our methods, on the other
hand, by enforcing global consistency, can effectively disambiguate the matches.
Looking at the results we can see that both our approaches extract around 50%
more correspondences than Bundler. The first approach provides a slight increase
in precision and reduction in variance of the estimates. Note, however, that the
selected measures evaluate the quality of the underlying least square estimates
of the motion parameters after a reprojection step, thus small variations are
expected. The approach enforcing a global 2D affine transformation exhibits a
larger increase in precision and reduction in variance. This can be explained by
the fact that the adjacent views of the two sequences have very little parallax
effects, thus the weak persective camera assumption holds quite well. In this
context the stricter model is better specified and thus more discriminative.
Next, we analyzed the impact of the algorithm parameters over the quality of
the results obtained. To this end, we investigated three parameters: the similarity
decay λ, the number k of candidate mates per features, and the quality threshold,
that is the minimum support for a correspondence to be considered non-extinct,
divided by the maximum support in the population. Figure 6 reports the results
of these experiments. The goal of these experiments was to show the sensitivity
to the matcher’s parameters, not to choose between constraints, so only the
3D geometric constraint was used. Overall, these experiments show that almost
all reasonable values of the parameters give similar values for the match, thus
those parameters have little influence over the quality of the result, with the
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Game-Theoretic approach achieving better average results and smaller standard
deviation than the Bundler matcher.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced a robust matching technique for feature points from
multiple views. Robustness is achieved by enforcing global geometric consistency
in a pairwise setting. Two different geometric consistency models are proposed.
The first enforces the compatibility with a single 3D rigid transformation of the
points. This is achieved by using the scale and orientation information offered by
SIFT features and projecting what is left of a high-order compatibility problem
into a pairwise compatibility measure, by enforcing the conservation of distances
between the unknown 3D positions of the points. The second model assumes a
weak perspective camera model and enforces that points are subject to an affine
transformation. This extracts only local groups at similar depths, but the match-
ing process is repeated to cover the whole scene. In both cases, a game-theoretic
approach is used to select a maximally consistent set of candidate matches, where
highly compatible matches are enforced while incompatible correspondences are
driven to extinction. Experimental comparisons with a widely used technique
show the ability of our approach to obtain more accurate estimates of the scene
parameters.
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